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Locating the normative within economic science: towards the 
analysis of hidden discourses of democracy in international 
politics 
 
By Milja Kurki 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Surrounding the science of economics is an aura of scientific authority that many other 
social sciences lack. Indeed, economic science is generally perceived as the closest 
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approximation to „pure‟ and „exact‟ sciences among the social sciences. It is conceived as 
such not only because it produces seemingly precise mathematical models with predictive 
capabilities, but also because it consistently seeks to apply a systematic approach to the 
study of the subject matter, an approach often referred to as „the scientific method‟. 
Economic scientists seek to fulfil the ideals of scientific analysis by applying two 
principal epistemological approaches: a rational deductive form of analysis (common in 
formal and mathematical economic theory) and empirical observation and testing 
(common in economic science focused on testing models) (MacCloskey 2002). Through 
these methods, and through bringing them together, economic science aims to produce 
scientifically valid and „objective‟ models and predictions of economic phenomena 
(Friedman 1953; Lipsey 1989).  
 
Whatever the advantages of these scientific aspirations, there is a discernible downside to 
the „scientific‟ ideals of economics. Because of their focus on exact and objective 
scientific modelling, economic scientists have been distinctly uncomfortable when 
dealing with problems of a „fuzzy‟ in nature, that is, matters difficult to (mathematically) 
define, measure, or quantify. Foremost among such matters are problems of „normative‟ 
nature, questions pertaining to what „ought to be‟ or evaluations concerning what counts 
as a „good person‟ or a „good society‟. Many economic scientists have, because of the 
aspiration to scientific objectivity, sought to avoid deciding on ethical questions of right 
or wrong and making judgements over what constitutes „the good life‟ (MacCloskey 
2006; Myrdal 1953). In Lipsey‟s words: „[e]conomic theory cannot…ever show us what 
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we ought to do, but only what will happen if we do certain things‟ (Lipsey 1989: xvii). 
Economic science is often perceived as, for want of a better word, a „technical‟ science. 
 
One consequence of the avoidance of normative questions in economics is that economic 
thought and theory has become dissociated in important respects from research conducted 
on „fuzzier‟ matters among social scientists, matters involving by necessity a measure of 
normative as well as analytic assessment. One inevitably „fuzzy‟ yet topical and 
important issue area among social and political scientists has been the analysis of 
democracy, and associated research agendas in comparative politics and international 
relations on democratisation and democracy promotion. The study of the fortunes of 
democracy has been an unsurprisingly popular research theme in the social sciences 
given the successive waves of democratisation that have characterised the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries, and the rise to almost unquestioned stature of the idea of democracy during the 
last decades (Sen 1999; Huntington 1993). Yet, these agendas are also uncomfortably 
„fuzzy‟ in nature, primarily because democracy as a concept is deeply contested in its 
meaning: the core values of democracy and conceptions of its institutional workings are 
contested among political theorists, political scientists and, indeed, different political 
actors (Whitehead 2002; Kurki forthcoming). Various models of democracy, from liberal 
democratic to participatory, from social democratic to deliberative, from Confucian to 
Islamic, present themselves as possible normative ideals – as well as as criteria of 
measurement – in the study of democratic dynamics (Held 1996; Shapiro 2003; Sadiki 
2004). Crucially, research on democracy, democratisation, or indeed democracy 
promotion inevitably involves taking a stance on the normative question: „what 
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constitutes an ideal democratic polity?‟ (Held 1996). This is because analytical 
judgements on the fortunes of democracy are also inevitably underpinned by one or 
another „normative‟ vision of democracy.  
 
Taking such fuzziness into account is a tricky matter for an objectivity-seeking 
„scientific‟ economic scientist to tackle, for making judgments upon normative questions 
entails engaging in a form of reasoning that seems to fall outside of the confines of his or 
her usual remit. Since economic analysts have been uncomfortable with normative 
questions, when they have dabbled in matters democratic – and a few brave economists 
have –, they have predominantly sought to contribute by augmenting the efforts of a 
number of equally scientifically-minded political scientists, who have aimed to 
understand the quantifiable impact that particular „economic variables‟, such as level of 
wealth or income, have on democracy (defined as a „measurable‟ variable) (see e.g. Barro 
1996, 1999; Bollen and Jackman 1985). Alternatively, they have explored the uses of 
formal rational choice models in tracing how economic rationalities interact with 
decision-making priorities and logics within democracies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 
Przeworski 1990). These efforts have made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate 
among some political scientists and sociologists on the impact of socio-economic 
development on levels of democracy and the prospects of democratisation (Lipset, 1960; 
Robinson, 2006; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Yet, through 
the application of the scientific method and the strict categorisation of criteria for what 
constitutes a democratic system, these economic scientists have sought to sidestep the 
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problem of normative contestation over the idea of democracy. It follows that their 
contribution to the study of democratisation has been rather narrowly confined.  
 
Yet, it is by no means clear that economists have little to contribute to the study of 
democracy, and nothing to say on the normative questions surrounding debates on 
democracy. Indeed, it is the aim of this article to seek a rekindling of the study of 
democracy and economic science perspectives. I want to take steps towards a clearer 
understanding of the ways in which „hidden‟ normative assumptions about democracy 
can be embedded in economic science.  
 
Some perceptive critics of mainstream economics have already noted that normative 
assumptions do play a key role in economic analysis, even when it pretends to be value-
neutral (Myrdal 1953, 1970; McCloskey 2008).  This study is motivated by and supports 
such insights. Yet, it also seeks to go further by aiming to elucidate specifically the role 
of assumptions that are made about democracy in economic science. I ask whether, 
despite the influence of value-neutral discourse, normative theories of democracy can be 
seen to be embedded in economic scientists‟ accounts of economic processes. 
 
But why is this an interesting question to ask? It is, first, theoretically interesting in 
allowing an exploration of the relationship between economics and other social sciences 
as well as in allowing us to probe further the theoretical underpinnings and the scope of 
economic theories. Yet, it is not only of interest for purely theoretical reasons, it is 
suggested here. The present study is, in fact, driven by an interest in the analysis of an 
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important contemporary world political issue area: a puzzle concerning the role of global 
financial institutions in relation to the idea of democracy promotion. Global financial 
governance organisations already „dabble‟ in matters close to the concerns of those actors 
who call themselves „democracy promoters‟, yet they have simultaneously, 
paradoxically, had to renounce such „political‟ interests because of the economistic 
discourse that drives these organisations. This paper seeks to develop theoretical insights 
through which we might be in a better position to study whether and how economic 
discourses, while seemingly value-neutral and „democracy-neutral‟, might, in fact, be 
considered as inherently tied to specific visions of democracy. I also want to explore the 
consequences that this might have for our understanding and study of the democracy 
promotion agenda.   
 
The argument proceeds in three steps. In the first part I analyse the nature of economic 
science discourse both in economic science and in the analysis of global financial 
governance and democracy promotion. We see that various paradoxes arise from the 
discourse of economic neutrality and especially so in global governance settings. In the 
second part I argue that if we reconsider the thought of some key figures in economic 
science, we can see that the objectivist „economistic‟ discourses and the „democracy-
neutral‟ assumptions made about economic science can, in fact, be seen as misleading. I 
argue that normative thought and „democratic visions‟ are passed on in economic theories 
examined, even if on occasion implicitly rather than explicitly. In the final section I trace 
the consequences of recognising the coming together of economic thought and normative 
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thought on democracy in relation to analysis of global financial governance and 
democracy promotion. 
 
 
The problem: discourses of economic neutrality and paradoxes of ‘democratic 
neutrality’ 
 
A discourse of value-neutrality plays an important role in economic science: economics is 
perceived predominantly as a positive science, which separates normative evaluations 
from scientific analysis. Such separation of facts and values became widespread after the 
so-called neoclassical revolution in economics in the 1870s and was solidified in the 
discipline through the development of economic science „orthodoxy‟ in the early 20th 
century (Myrdal 1953). While accounting for the history of economic science, or even the 
full extent of the diversity in current economic science, is beyond the scope of this piece, 
it may be useful to take a closer look at how some key economic science texts view the 
aims and scope of economic science.  
 
Case and Fair‟s popular textbook Principles of Economics (1996) provides one excellent 
example of the way in which „positivist‟ underpinnings work in economic science. Case 
and Fair‟s text starts by setting out the key trends in mainstream economic science and 
the core assumptions that underlie the study of economics. They argue, first, that 
economics is a „behavioural science‟ based on study of how people make choices. 
Second, and crucially for our purposes, they argue that it entails a strict separation of two 
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types of questions: normative and positive. Positive economics, Case and Fair argue 
(1996: 9), tries to understand economic systems „without making judgement about 
whether the outcomes are good or bad‟. Case and Fair accept the existence of a branch of 
economics called „normative economics‟, but make it clear that mainstream economic 
science is something quite distinct from this. „Positive‟ economists, who constitute the 
core of economic science, should try to steer clear of normative questions and focus on 
what is verifiable or quantifiable observationally, or justifiable in terms of analytical 
logic. While they recognise that values may play a role in economic science, they argue 
that „it is nevertheless important to distinguish between analyses that attempt to be 
positive and those that are intentionally and explicitly normative‟ (Case and Fair 1996: 
9).  
 
It is no surprise that economists trained on textbooks such as this are directed, not to 
ignore normative issues, but to separate such issues from their „scientific‟ work. 
Economics as a science becomes seen as value-neutral and normative evaluations as 
something that falls outside it (Myrdal 1953). Importantly, such notions of „economic 
science‟ also travel outside the economics profession. Assumptions about „objectivity‟ 
and „economic neutrality‟ of economic perspectives have come to influence the political 
sciences. Accepting the „independence‟ and „objectivity‟ of economic thought has been 
an attractive notion for many social scientists – partly perhaps because of lack of detailed 
engagement with economic theory but also partly because isolation of economics as a 
distinct, somehow more scientific discipline, has been seen as a way of protecting other 
social sciences from some economists‟ grand ambitions to unite the social sciences under 
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„economistic‟ frameworks of thought. The result in any case has been the estrangement of 
economic theory from other social sciences.  
 
This estrangement can also be seen in the estrangement of thought on democracy and 
economics. This is at first glance strange; this is because economic conditions have 
always been considered to be central in analysis of democratisation. Democratisation and 
democracy promotion literature in comparative politics and international relations has 
classically seen socio-economic conditions as a key aspect of its remit: ever since 
Lipset‟s (1960) studies of wealth as a key conditioning factor of democratic development, 
much attention has been paid to the study of socio-economic conditions of 
democratisation (Barro 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski 1990; Przeworski 
et al. 2000). Yet, arguably economic conditions of democratisation only feature in a 
specific manner in this literature, in a manner that treats economic models or explanations 
as distinct from any studies of the normative foundations or visions of democracy. The 
methods applied to the study of democracy are „objectivist‟ and economists‟ 
engagements with the study of pre-conditions of democracy have explicitly sought to 
exclude exploration of the possibility that their own analytical models might be 
normatively predisposed in one direction or another, and indeed towards some normative 
visions of democracy over others. 
 
Simultaneously, it is fair to say that democratisation and democracy promotion literature 
in political science and international relations has tended to treat economists‟ models as 
distinctly scientific. While in the study of democratisation there is recognition of the 
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essential contestability of democracy and the existence of different normative models of 
democracy (Whitehead 2002; Burnell 2000), normative deliberations on the meaning of 
democracy are not linked to reflection on the implications of economic models for the 
meaning of democracy. This is despite the fact that liberal capitalist economic model is 
widely accepted as a grounding for liberal democracy, the preferred normative model of 
democracy (Diamond 2008; Mandelbaum 2007; Simons et al 2008; Burnell 2000; 
Whitehead 2002; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski 1990). The encouragement of 
the liberal democratic normative ideal, it seems then, comes with an implicit but powerful 
economic ideal. Yet, reflection on why there is a close linkage between these models and 
on the normative nature of advocacy of liberal capitalism receives little attention.  
 
Economistic neutrality in global financial governance 
 
Moreover, it is not only in academia that we can observe estrangement of economic 
thought and debate on democracy. It is no surprise that value-neutral logics of economic 
science thinking also travel outside into national and global policy-making and beyond 
into the wider society. The rise of „economistic‟ discourses and the assumptions of 
„economic neutrality‟ have been traced in excellent ways by a number of sociologists of 
economic thought and international relations scholars (see e.g. MacKenzie 2008; 
Swedberg 1986; Teivainen 2002). Reviewing this literature is beyond the aims of this 
piece, yet it is crucial to note that this literature has powerfully recorded the role of 
economism and economic neutrality assumptions in global governance settings. A 
discourse of economic neutrality has been a crucial underpinning of global financial 
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governance throughout the 20
th
 century and has, moreover, become hardened in recent 
years by the rise of neoliberalism. Global economic expertise, informed by objective 
economic science analyses, is conceived as purely technical and apolitical, and 
simultaneously seemingly disinterested in exploration of democratic normative ideals 
(Patomaki and Teivainen 2004: 46-7; Swedberg 1986; Teivainen 2002).  
 
Yet, what is very interesting is that this discourse is also paradoxical. Although it is often 
assumed that international financial organisations should not interfere with matters 
„political‟, nor normative debates about what counts as „good life‟ in societies, these 
organisations do in fact engage with many political and normative matters. IMF and the 
World Bank, for example, hold distinct views on the promotion of good governance and 
on anti-corruption (Swedberg 1986; Marquette 2001, 2003; Weaver 2008). Dalliances 
with political matters, and the occasional use of rhetoric of democracy, create important 
paradoxes and contradictions, or organized hypocrisy (Weaver 2008) in the roles, 
functions and institutional identities of global financial governance actors. For example, 
while involving themselves in debates about corruption – a matter deeply political and 
normative in nature – there is a tendency for international financial organisations to 
simultaneously pull away from excessive commitments in these areas. Also, because of 
the perceived illegitimacy of extending their mandates to such matters, global financial 
organisations tend to maintain a distinctly value-neutral and „technical‟ rhetoric in 
dealing with these (inherently political and normative) areas.  
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Given the estrangement of thought on democracy and economy, and the consequences for 
the analysis of democratisation and global financial governance, it seems pertinent to 
revisit the linkage of economic and democratic thought. With the guiding hypothesis 
which speculates that, in fact, democratic and economic thought may be more closely 
interlinked than is often acknowledged, this article aims to analyse whether the problems 
of democratisation analysis, as well as the workings and paradoxes of global financial 
governance organisations, might be elucidated through a closer examination of the kinds 
of „democratic‟ normativity that may underpin economic science discourses.  
 
Revisiting core economic scientists 
 
To do so I seek to study in some detail the normative and democratic assumptions within 
the work of three key economists: Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich 
Hayek. Not only are they towering figures in modern economic science, but also, as we 
will see, they are far more complex characters on these issues than is often recognised. 
When examined in detail, we can see that each of these figures advances a normative and 
democracy-infused set of views on economic science, challenging the positive science-
normative theory distinction that has come to define the disciplinary „common sense‟ in 
economics and beyond.  
 
These scholars are also particularly interesting to study because of their central roles in 
the „story‟ of the development of economic science. The common narrative underlying 
the dominant positivist and economistic trends in contemporary economics is that an 
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objectivity seeking approach to economics was initiated initially by Adam Smith, the 
father of liberal economic thought. Smith, it is suggested, was the first to advocate a full 
systematic analysis of economic life and identified an independent „objectively‟ 
functioning economic system. In Smith‟s aftermath, so the story goes, the fact-value 
distinction was perfected at the end of the 19
th
 century by the „marginalist‟ neoclassical 
economists, such as Alfred Marshall (Teivainen 2002: 24-5), who were then followed by 
their students, even those who took away steps from neoclassical theory, such as John 
Maynard Keynes. Since the 1970s, and culminating in the thought of figures such as 
Friedrich Hayek, economics has been, it is commonly accepted, on the road to perfecting 
itself as a „positive science‟ – perceived to be either on a „progressive unilinear process of 
refinement, removing from the discipline what is sloppy, partisan, or biased‟ (Nelson 
1996: 51) or alternatively, in the eyes of its critics, on the road to narrow „economism‟.  
 
While it is, indeed, true that there has been a distinct growth in the discourse of economic 
neutrality since the late 19
th
 century, it could be argued that this historical narrative is 
also deeply problematic because it assumes that Adam Smith, the marginalists, or the 
neoliberals for that matter, were „value-neutralists‟. As we will see, not only are there 
distinct normative foundations that underlie the rise of economic science, but also ever 
since the supposed value-neutral turn, there has been much implicit, as well as on 
occasion explicit, „sliding‟ in economics from scientific-explanatory claims to normative 
statements. This has, crucially, entailed sliding towards specific normative positions on 
the meaning of the idea of democracy. Taking this into account has crucial effects for 
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analysis of the role of financial governance and of democracy promotion, as we will see 
in the final section.  
 
 
The normative within positive science: discourses of democracy in economic science 
 
In examining the three authors chosen for the study here – Adam Smith, John Maynard 
Keynes and Friedrich Hayek – a two-stage approach is adopted. I analyse, first, their 
general orientations towards „normative questions‟, moving on to a detailed analysis of 
the conceptions of democracy embedded in their frameworks. 
 
Economic theorists and their perception of the normative aspects of economic science 
 
Adam Smith is often considered the „father‟ of modern economics. Smith‟s work has 
been heavily associated with the argument that the economic sphere constitutes a sphere 
of its own, independent of other social spheres, which should be studied by focusing on 
the analysis of its specific laws and predictabilities. He has also been seen as having been 
the author who gave the initial impetus for a scientific neutrality-seeking approach to the 
science of economics: one that prioritises a careful factual analysis of economic 
distribution and supply and demand over moral questions (see for example Teivainen 
2002). Yet, these assumptions are problematic for in Smith‟s account various normative 
assumptions and arguments play a role. 
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Scottish political economists, including Smith, were, importantly, not just political 
economists, but also philosophers and moral theorists. Smith too, while famous for his 
Wealth of Nations (1994), was also well-known as a moral theorist and the author of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976). Indeed, his economic thought was tightly inter-
woven with the core principles of his moral philosophy, with important consequences for 
his economic science. First, although Smith‟s Wealth of Nations was famously an 
analysis of the autonomous and self-regulating logic of commerce and based on a view of 
individuals as purely self-interested actors, it is important to note that Smith‟s views on 
society, and on human character, were more rounded than this implies. A key aspect of 
his moral theory was the idea that individuals are capable of sympathetic interaction with 
other individuals. Indeed, his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976) was centred around 
explicating how a system of natural justice could be built upon the development of 
sympathy between individuals. Crucially, Smith saw such a system of justice as 
fundamental in society where economic interactions had a tendency to work on the basis 
of self-interest (albeit, on the whole productively so). Economic self-interest then should 
not, for Smith, be the only guiding value in societal life. Crucially, for Smith, „self-
interest was a self-interest permeated with ideas of justice‟ (Backhouse 1985: 16*). 
 
There is another important part of Smith‟s moral framework that informed his economic 
thought: his belief in the value of individual liberty. Smith was a believer in the „natural 
rights‟ of individuals to liberty. Far from an a-normative theorist Smith was something of 
a natural law theorist who derived both assumptions concerning what „is‟ and what 
„ought to be‟ from the idea that a „natural order‟ of things assigned certain things to be 
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true, notably the inviolability of the right of liberty (Myrdal 1953). Arguably, it is 
because of this belief as much as any of his empirical or analytical conclusions that Smith 
ends up calling for freedom of enterprise in his Wealth of Nations. 
 
Crucially, Smith‟s economic theory then is tied in closely with his moral theories of the 
individual, society and justice. His economic science cannot be conceived as value-
neutral: it is utterly ridden with moral assumptions and normative claims. This can also 
seen in Smith‟s conception of the practical role of economic analysis. Unlike later 
positivists that sought to separate economic science from practical policy-making, Smith 
does no such thing. For Smith economics is linked to moral theory as much it is linked to 
directing of policy-practice in particular normatively and politically desirable directions. 
The value of „political economy‟ is not in its neutrality, but on the contrary its practical, 
and simultaneously, its moral and normative qualities. 
 
But what about the other two economic scientists under examination here? Are they more 
consistently value-neutral in their approach? John Maynard Keynes, it seems, was a 
positive economist in his orientation. He accepted by and large his tutor‟s Alfred 
Marshall‟s approach, which separated economic reasoning from ethical reasoning. The 
core of the neoclassical revolution instigated by Jevons, Walras and later Marshall was 
that ethical questions should be separated from „normative‟ questions. Economic science 
was to be a „pure‟ science where normative concerns did not direct inquiry (see for 
example Paul 1979; Marshall 1997). Keynes‟s approach to economic science is in line 
with this. While he was sceptical of the overuse of statistical methods (Backhouse and 
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Bateman 2006; 13), he emphasised objective scientific knowledge as the key to economic 
science. Indeed, his criticism of neoclassical economists was that they had failed to be 
adequately objective in their analyses, having instead clung to neoclassical precepts as a 
matter of ideology (Brittan 2006: 182). Keynes saw economics as a particularly 
technocratic and technical discipline, as one akin to dentistry (Waligorski 1997: 61). 
 
Yet, despite the seeming value-neutrality of his approach, Keynes‟s treatment of 
normative thinking is also far from straightforward, for when examined in detail, it 
clearly does not meet the standards of strict value-neutrality. While his economic science 
writing was objectivist in tone, many deeply normative and political conclusions flowed 
from Keynes‟s economic theory, and on occasion he openly recognised this. In the final 
section of the General Theory, for example, Keynes clearly acknowledges the normative 
implications that flow from his theoretical critique of classical understandings of 
unemployment (2007: 372-92). In his other works too, as a practically-minded thinker, 
Keynes extended his discussion to the political consequences and responsibilities that 
arise from his economic theories, which emphasised the need for active intervention and 
engagement with economic processes, rather than operation of „law-like tendencies‟. His 
thought then, while not explicitly normative or political in tone, had many normative and 
political implications. So much so that some commentators drawing out his political 
thinking have called Keynes a „political philosopher‟ as much as an economic theorist, „if 
only in the very broad sense of the term, synonymous with “having a political outlook, 
much of it implicit”‟ (Brittan 2006: 180). 
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But if Smith and Keynes can be argued to have waivered on the question of objectivity, 
surely the father of neoliberalism, Friedrich Hayek, can be seen as the paragon of value-
neutralism?  
 
Seemingly, indeed, Friedrich Hayek‟s approach follows the logic of economic scientism 
and objectivism. The point of economic science is to find the laws of the spontaneous 
order in the economic sphere. Indeed, this is crucial for any „purposive organisation‟ of 
political and social life should be premised on an adequate understanding of the laws of 
the „spontaneous order‟ (Hayek, 1972). It is, arguably, because of this distinction between 
spontaneous order and purposive organisation that Hayek is sympathetic to the fact-value 
distinction in economic theory, which Friedman (1953) had emphasised. Economic 
theory tries to decipher the laws of the spontaneous order, and in understanding these 
laws there should be no particular normative or political interference. 
 
Yet, Hayek is not a consistent value-neutral thinker either: in fact, he was value-driven in 
his advocacy of the liberal market system and even moved towards an explicitly social 
philosophical approach in the 1970s to emphasise this. It is important to note that even in 
the post-II World War era Hayek did not disagree with the communist or the social 
democratic system merely on practical/pragmatic grounds, but on value grounds: these 
systems restricted, yes, the efficient functioning of social and economic systems, but also, 
and far more fundamentally, they infringed the normative principles of individual liberty 
(Hayek 1944). At its core, Hayek‟s thought was directed at changing society according to 
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a particular normative vision, what could be called a „utopian‟ vision, centred around 
liberty. Indeed, normative and utopian thought, he recognises, is essential for him since:  
 
an ideal picture of society which may not be wholly achievable, or a guiding 
conception of the overall order aimed at, is… not only the indispensable 
precondition of any rational policy, but also the chief contribution that science can 
make to the solution of the problems of practical policy (Hayek quoted in Hodgson 
1999: 5). 
 
Normative and political assumptions then seem to be embedded in these authors‟ 
economic theories. Indeed, as Gunnar Myrdal (1953) has shown, despite the seemingly 
sharp turn to value-neutrality in economic science as a result of the 1970s neoclassical 
revolution, a number of key economists never fully did away with normative forms of 
argumentation. Normative leanings on many levels remained in economic science 
frameworks.  
 
But are these authors interested not just in normative questions but possibly also 
normative visions of democracy? Indeed, they are. 
 
Smith’s liberal proto-theory of democracy 
 
Adam Smith did not speak about democracy in explicit terms. Yet, when his economic 
theory is analysed in detail, arguably elements of a „theory of democracy‟ become 
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evident in his account. It is interesting to note that Smith had: 1) a vision of the values 
that were to guide society that are consistent with liberal democratic theory; 2) a clear 
view of political institutions that envisions representative political institution and rule of 
law on grounds of equality; and 3) a specific liberal view of the role of the state in the 
economy. A „liberal politico-economic theory of democracy‟ then comes through in 
Smith‟s political economy.  
 
First, Smith had definite ideas about the values that should dominate in a „good 
commercial society‟. These were, first, respect for „natural liberty‟ of the individual and, 
second, encouragement of sympathy between fellow citizens. Fostering of both values 
was seen as crucial in societal life, though the first in many ways was more fundamental. 
But in what ways do these values link to democratic thought? They do so in an 
„accidental‟ but important sense: they are very much consistent with the societal values of 
liberal democracy as envisaged by other liberal democratic thinkers before and after 
Smith. Smith‟s emphasis on natural liberty is very close to that of Locke, considered one 
of the early thinkers on representative democracy, and also that of later utilitarian 
theorists of democracy. It should also be noted that his additional concern for sympathy 
between individuals is close to the view of democratic values emphasised by J.S. Mill, 
where belief in freedom of individual was, in a fair and democratic system, to be 
tempered by considerations for the well-being of fellow human beings.  
 
The second, and a far more distinctly „democratic‟ quality in his thought, was Smith‟s 
view that the liberal economic system and its perfection went hand in hand with a view of 
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what constituted the right kind of political and legal structures in society. Economic 
interaction of an open and free kind was to be embedded in a political institution of 
representative government and the legal institution of rule of law, which ensured the 
equal and consistent treatment of each enterprising individual. Crucially, these „liberal 
democratic‟ institutional qualities were both necessitated by Smith‟s very conception of 
the functioning of the economic system. They formed a part and parcel of his economic 
theory. They were called for because it was only within representative institutions and the 
equalising rule of law that the liberal economic system of production and exchange could 
be maintained. The liberal representative political institutions and rule of law served a 
crucial economic function. Unless entrepreneurs could be guaranteed stability of 
expectations in society – both in political system and before law, they would be unable to 
make predictions needed for making future investments. Thus, representative government 
and rule of law were crucial because they stabilised social context, making expectations 
of future profit margins and actions by competitors possible (Berry 1997). Liberal 
representative governance, then, for Smith, as for many other liberal democrats at the 
time, was seen as desirable because it was conducive to maintenance of order, market-
liberal values, and stability of expectations necessary for a society in which 
entrepreneurship was to play a crucial role. Smith‟s thinking here is closely in line with 
advocates especially of „protective‟ liberal democracy, such as Locke, Bentham and 
James Mill (see MacPherson 1977 for a more detailed discussion). 
 
Finally, of course, we must note that the very political and moral impetus of Smith‟s tract 
was to make the case for limited governmental intervention in economic life. His 
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economic science was such that it entailed, almost by definition, a theory of 
representative governance that sought to, while guarantee stability of expectations in 
society in general, delimit any direct political interference in the market. For Smith, an 
ideal state was to refrain from excessive interference from the „natural order‟ of things. 
Hence, contrary to socialist or social welfare theorists, representative government, while 
a crucial condition of an efficient market system, was not to excessively interfere in the 
market. Representative government‟s role was to maintain support for liberal markets, 
not to meddle in it. This argument, again, is entirely in line with the liberal democratic 
theorists of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century.  
 
In sum, Smith clearly „did not draw the distinction between positive and normative 
economics‟(Paul 1979: 17) and his thought was also deeply entwined with support for a 
liberal „politico-economic model of democracy‟ of a very particular „liberal 
representative‟ kind.  
 
Keynes and democracy 
 
Keynes, the key critic of many of the core precepts of neoclassical economics, did not 
perceive himself as a democratic theorist. Yet, it is curious that for many of his followers 
Keynesianism has become, not only an attractive approach to economic theory and 
practice, but an avenue into the construction of a distinct kind of democracy: often called 
social democracy (Berman 2006; Tilton 1991). Is it possible that Keynesian science of 
economics may not be as value- and democracy-neutral as Keynes seemed to envisage? 
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Keynes in his General Theory (2007) argued that some of the classical and neoclassical 
assumptions on the determination of wages, unemployment and growth led to gross 
misunderstandings and would result in massive social problems if applied in practice in 
an economic crisis. In his understanding, cutting wages would not help, but rather 
government should actively intervene in the economy to promote employment. It was 
important to maintain people‟s „propensity to consume‟ and confidence in the economy. 
Government spending and taxation then could be used to stabilize the level of 
employment. Keynes‟s conclusions were revolutionary and became widely practiced in 
post-war environment. But how does Keynesian economic theory speak to democratic 
theory, if at all? It does so in three ways.  
 
First, it was a theory of economics that explicitly argued for political control over 
markets. In so doing, it attacked the assumption that economics is a discreet „naturally 
harmonious‟ social sphere, which could not and should not be politically controlled. 
While the control of markets, crucially, need not have been democratic (the general 
principles of Keynesianism are consistent also with a technocratic approach), Keynes‟s 
emphasis on the political control over markets opened up the possibility of democratic 
control of the markets. It challenged the notion of a „spontaneous‟ independent economic 
sphere. Human volition and political will, and thereby also the possibility of democratic 
control, became possible and positively encouraged within the market. Economic 
questions became seen as political questions (Waligorski 1997: 39). This had been denied 
by definition by the liberal laissez-faire theorists, who advocated a narrow and limited 
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elitist procedural conception of democracy, the role of which was decidedly not to 
intervene in the market (MacPherson 1977).  
 
In his approach to the idea of democracy, Keynes was not particularly interested, it 
seems, in radically challenging the classical parliamentary system of democracy. Indeed, 
contrary to some other „new liberals‟ (Hobhouse 1963), Keynes‟s approach to democracy 
did not involve development of radical or participatory systems of democracy in 
opposition to classical liberal democratic representative institutions. Yet, contrary to the 
claims of some commentators, Keynes was by no means an anti-democratic theorist, nor 
disinterested in development of liberal democracy in new directions (Waligorski 1997: 
38). Indeed, Keynes it could be argued, was deeply interested in revision of the 
conservative Schumpeterian elitist vision of democracy dominant at the time among 
many economist and politicians. Indeed, Keynes‟s approach to economics entailed if not 
a direct critique, a deep scepticism of the narrowest laissez-faire politico-economic 
models, which, for him, was seen to „endanger both capitalism and democracy‟ 
(Waligorski 1997: 44). The lack of concern for „social detail‟ in laissez-faire economism, 
as well as in the narrow competitive model of democracy it entailed, had to be 
challenged. Both capitalism and democracy would have to take a more redistributive, 
welfare-attuned and social justice-driven outlook.  
 
Keynes‟s emphases on social justice and sustainable democracy, one could argue, were 
more pragmatic than anything else, yet they have had important consequences for 
democracy theory and normative debate on what democracy should consist in.  
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The full political theory of social democracy implied by Keynes was developed in most 
interesting ways in the Swedish context. Here „Keynesianism‟ developed into a fully-
fledged political and normative theory of democracy (Tilton 1991). A key aspect this 
theory was the political control of the market. Swedish social democratic principles in 
economics entailed the extension of the idea of democracy away from the narrow 
electoral/political conception of democracy. A unique idea of „integrative democracy‟ 
emerged as a result. Institutionally, this entailed a dual strand democracy: democracy on 
electoral level, but democracy deepened by addition of democratic control over economic 
policy through working people‟s associations and trade union involvement in 
determination of overall national wage policy. This was in line with Keynes‟s own 
comments: he implied he was in favour of corporatism, as fostering of big firms willing 
to discuss public policy and wage levels with the government was a crucial aspect in a 
functioning stable economy (Brittan 2006: 185). In the Swedish context the Keynesian 
ideas were developed into fully-fledged institutional reformulation of liberal democracy 
by a selection of a normatively reflective trade union economists (such and Meidner and 
Rehn) and economically trained political actors (such as Wigforss and Adler-Karlsson). 
This came to entail a unique theory of democracy, one:  
 
committed to creating a society where first industrial workers and then employees in 
general participated on equal terms in the organization and governance of society. 
The democratic ideal ought to infuse not only political life but social and economic 
organisation as well (Tilton 1990: 257-8). 
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While Keynes‟s theory may have been value-neutral and seemingly disinterested in 
theories of democracy, his ideas did develop a distinctive normative vision of democracy. 
With his emphasis on social justice and equality alongside economic freedom, he opened 
up doors for social democratic models of democracy. His economic discourse enabled a 
line of thinking that emphasised political control over markets and value-wise put 
emphasis on solidarity and social justice in wage policy (enabled by Keynesian findings 
on the insignificance of level of wage for general profits, if inflation could be counted in). 
These ideas were, in the Swedish context for example, developed into a unique dual track 
approach to democracy where electoral democracy was complemented by wage-earners 
input into general wage-level policy. This politico-economic model of democracy was 
quite distinct from the liberal models – either protective or developmental, but also of 
Marxist models, which entailed communistic ownership policies. Keynesianism is then 
not insignificant for the development of democratic theory in the 20
th
 century, although 
this has gone unnoticed for many economists as well as some democratic theorists.  
 
 
Hayek and democracy 
 
Friedrich Hayek, the „father‟ of neoliberalism, is another interesting figure to examine. 
Neoliberalism has of course been seen as the culmination point of economistic thinking 
and hence we would expect Hayek‟s economic theorising to be highly hostile to 
normative and democratic thought. Yet, if we pay his thought close attention we can see 
 27 
that Hayek‟s analysis was not only normative, it was actively engaged in dealing with 
matters „political‟ and indeed „democratic‟.  
 
Hayek‟s analysis in Road to Serfdom (1944), Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, 
Liberty and Legislation (1973) re-enforced the need to move away from socialist 
systems. His aim was to re-invigorate western political systems through arguing for the 
crucial significance of the value of personal liberty. At the heart of Hayek‟s thinking is a 
call for freedom of action in the economic realm, the value of economic liberty, but he 
argues that to attain this we must also refashion the political and legal spheres. Indeed, 
while his system of thought was built on the value of economic liberty (and efficiency), 
his aim was to rethink, on these basis, the nature of political systems and democratic 
constitutionalism. Crucial to this democratic vision is the idea of rule of law and 
emphasis on the role of representative electoral democracy as legitimizing mechanism in 
transitions of power (Vasquez-Arroyo 2008: 131-2). 
 
Arguably, three core elements of a liberal democratic theory were in-built within Hayek‟s 
account of economics: 1) advocacy of (economic) liberty as a key value in democratic 
states, 2) promotion of liberal proceduralist constitutional democracy as the best way to 
realise democratic governance in an affluent society, and 3) discouragement of political 
control over the economy in favour of a system where individual liberty was prioritised.  
 
Hayek‟s thinking, while influential in economic theory and economic policy, was in its 
essence a theory of democracy, a particular kind of procedural liberal theory of 
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democracy, the aims of which was to guarantee economic freedom and the stability of 
markets. He wanted to steer us clear of substantive notions of democracy of the social 
democrats and the socialists: democracy‟s core aim was to provide a system of legal and 
political equality, which would simultaneously ensure efficient functioning of markets 
and delimit excessive political control over the market.  
 
It follows then that we should remember that the neoliberalism that arises from the works 
of Hayek, or Friedman for that matter (Friedman 2002 [1962]), should not be treated as a-
normative and a-democratic. They are interventions not just in economic thought, but 
rather in political democratic thought. For them the liberal economic order that is 
envisaged needs as well as maintains „democracy‟, while arguably also diluting its 
substance to a minimal liberal procedural conception of democracy (Vasquez-Arroyo 
2008: 130).  
 
What is curious about Hayek is that in his vision the economic sphere is, if you like, 
normatively prioritised but also simultaneously cut off from the democratic, this 
constituting the core element of their very understanding of democracy, the very core of 
this „politico-economic model of democracy‟. Indeed, this vision of democracy is 
fascinating: for in it culminates on the one hand the separation of economic and political, 
and economic and normative, and at the same time the value-based advocacy of these 
separations.  
 
Politico-economic models of democracy in economic science 
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An analysis that, instead of buying the „value-neutral‟ rhetoric of economic scientists, 
actually pays attention to normative assumptions within their accounts is highly 
informative of the underlying dynamics and consequences of these authors‟ theories. It 
reveals not only the deep normativity of their frameworks – the tying together of 
explanatory and normative assumptions – but also the hidden theories of democracy 
embedded in their frameworks, with preferences for specific kind of democratic values, 
institutions and politico-economic orders. Economic theorists, far from having nothing to 
say about democracy, actually seem to, if often implicitly, advocate very specific 
„politico-economic models of democracy‟, which are both „explanatory‟ and „normative‟ 
in nature. 
 
These models, crucially, vary in significant ways from each other. While Smith and 
Hayek, for example, link economic theory of liberalism with a specific form of 
representational democracy, and prioritise values of economic freedom and limited state 
intervention in the economy, a Keynesian model challenges not only the theoretical 
premises of this model but also its normative underpinnings. Notably, it develops, or at 
least opens up the possibility for a radically different perception of what democracy 
should consist in. For social democratic thinkers that have developed Keynes‟s ideas 
further, mere parliamentary democracy is insufficient, instead wider integrative 
democratic institutions need to be built for true social democracy to emerge. 
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The analysis of the politico-economic models of democracy in economic science 
discourses and theories is of course inevitably limited here. A wider analysis would 
arguably reveal an even greater variety of models of democracy in economic science 
theories and discourses, as well as being able to trace in detail how normative leanings 
are embedded in specific theoretical formulations in economic science.
1
 We would be 
able to see that not only were there distinct variations of the liberal model of democracy 
embedded in J.S. Mill‟s and Alfred Marshall‟s economic theories, but also distinct 
notions of democracy, many developing „participatory democratic‟ theories, could be 
identified in the works of many „reform liberals‟, from Galbraith to Thurow (Waligorski 
1997). Yet, what we have learned even from the limited analysis here is that if we open 
our eyes to analysis of hidden normative assumptions within economic science, economic 
theorists can be seen as theorists of democracy as well as of economics. Economic 
thought it seems is inextricable tied to political theory debates about democracy, despite 
the lip-service paid by most economists to value-neutrality.  
 
 
The significance of exploring hidden economic theories of democracy  
 
The analysis above has directed us to pay attention to the close tying together of 
economic and democratic theories and discourses: in other words, it has directed us to 
pay attention to „politico-economic theories of democracy‟. But what are the 
consequences of such an analysis for the study of global financial governance and the 
                                                 
1
 See the work of Gunnar Myrdal (1953; 1970) for some such detail. 
 31 
paradoxes within them, and indeed for analysis of the dynamics of democratisation and 
democracy promotion?  
 
First, in the analysis of global financial governance, we are confronted with the need to 
remain sensitive to the „hidden‟ normative visions that can be embedded in the technical, 
objectivist, and scientific language of these institutions. Language of efficiency or 
equilibriums can sound technical, but underneath an objectivist face lie, most probably, a 
set of normative concepts, decisions and preferences. Analytical categories all too often 
become blurred with and hide political and normative ideals (Myrdal 1953: 104). Indeed, 
although non-economic audiences often fail to spot the hidden normativity passed on in 
economic theories, assessments and policies, and although economic theorists and 
practising economists themselves remain inadequately attuned to normative arguments 
and contradictions in their frameworks, economic science economics discourses are not 
as value-neutral as is generally thought (Myrdal 1970).  We need to be in a position to 
pay attention to the hidden normativity of economic science discourses and how they are 
played out in economic policy, political debate, society in general and, indeed, in global 
financial governance frameworks. It is not within the scope of this particular piece to 
analyse in detail these frameworks, policies and discourses but the theoretical under-
labouring conducted here points us towards this important empirical research agenda. 
 
A „re-normativised‟ image of economic science is also important in potentially allowing 
us to understand and tackle the paradoxes evident in current global financial institutions, 
notably the curious shifting between economic and political priorities pointed to by the 
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likes of Marquette (2001) and Weaver (2008). When we see a role for normative 
assumptions and implicit visions of democracy in economic science, we can start to 
understand why there might be such strange and contradictory pushes within these 
organisations. While economic science discourse denies political and normative visions, 
we have seen here that we need to recognise that political and normative visions form an 
essential part of economic thinking and modelling, even for the hard value-neutralists 
such as the neoliberals. In the same sense that views of what is a desirable representative 
system within a liberal economy for Smith or Haeyk, World Bank and IMF too, quite 
reasonably (although in an internally contradictory manner), mix together visions of 
economic and political orders. This clashes with the overall tone of the objectivist 
discourse, yet the pulls towards political and normative matters are revealed in the 
dabbling in good governance and anti-corruption policies. Normative and political 
prescriptions as to what constitutes „good life‟ do not really fall outside of the scope of 
IMF and World Bank do, even though no formal mandate exists for their interventions in 
non-economic areas. With politico-economic theories of democracy in mind it is not 
surprising to note that these organisations „dabble‟ in these areas: even though they are 
economic organisations, they are not a-political, technical organisations but organisations 
deeply concerned with prescriptions of good life.  
 
At present the global financial organisations are quite ill-prepared to take this into 
account. Even those commentators within the organisations that see slippage between 
ideological value-systems, economic science and economic objectivism in policy making, 
try to retain the hope in value-neutral economic science as the ideal that economists 
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working in global governance should aim for (Stiglitz 1998: 14, 37). The idealised image 
of value-neutrality, it is suggested here, is an unrealistic and incoherent aim
2
 and leads us 
to misunderstand the nature and scope of the influence of these organisations.  
  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that recognising the hidden „theories of democracy‟ within 
economic science discourses and hence in global financial organisations allows us to 
rethink what constitutes „democracy promotion‟ in international politics. As we have 
seen, economic science seems to be far removed from democracy debates, while 
simultaneously being also implicitly influential on formulations of models of „good life‟ 
for societies. This is important to note for particular models of democracy can be 
advocated by these organisations. Since they follow largely liberal discourses it is 
predominantly variations of liberal democratic thought that is being reproduced in these 
organisations – arguments for Hayekian and Smithian kind of procedural and rule of law 
governed society, which facilitates economic and political liberty of individuals. 
Interestingly, the implicit and potentially significant role of global financial organisations 
in democracy promotion is often not noticed by the so-called „democracy promoters‟, 
who pride themselves as uniquely interested in improving political quality of life in 
societies, nor in academic democracy promotion debates, which often fail to analyse in-
depth the politico-economic discourses that underpin democratisation and democracy 
promotion efforts (see for example Diamond 2008; Burnell 2000).  
 
                                                 
2
 This insight supports the philosophy of science critiques of many critics of orthodox economic philosophy 
of science (see for example Lawson, 1997; 2003). 
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The approach advocated here allows us to approach the analysis of democratisation and 
democracy promotion in a new way, by bringing into the scope of our analysis of 
democracy promotion an analysis of economic actors as potentially powerful and 
influential, if often rather implicit and unreflexive, type of democracy promoter. Paying 
attention to these actors allows us to not only have a wider view of what democracy 
promotion is, but crucially, also the ways in which the agenda of democracy promoters 
can be shaped in implicit and deep-running ways on the level of global financial 
organisations. Thus, for example, it is interesting to note that key democracy promoters, 
such as the EU, pay heed to IMF‟s and World Bank‟s economic policy directions as an 
underpinning of their own „political‟ efforts. This confines the scope and nature of their 
democracy promotion efforts: for only specific kind of „politico-economic‟ alternatives 
and underpinnings can, as a result, be envisaged (or at least coherently envisaged). 
Indeed, since it seems that in the global financial governance organisations a strong (if 
implicit) preference exists for a „protective‟ liberal democratic system (given that a 
dominant currents in economic thinking have in-built within them a preference for this 
sort of democracy), it is likely that this preferencing disenables and indeed dismisses 
other normative visions that target states might have for „good democratic governance‟, 
such as social democratic or participatory democratic alternatives (see e.g. Abrahamsen, 
2000). Since the hidden normative preferences within economic sphere of policy-making 
can place constraints on the scope of the kind of democratic politics that can be 
envisioned in the world scene, it is important to note that it is not only the self-avowed 
democracy promotion agencies that „promote democracy‟ in world politics, the global 
financial organisations do so too.  
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Simultaneously, the approach here reveals another aspect to analysis of democracy 
promotion: if financial organisations can be implicit democracy promoters, then perhaps 
democracy promoters too are implicit economic actors, promoting particular visions of 
economic life in target states. This insight taps into an interesting contradictory trend in 
democracy promotion and democracy promotion literature. While most democracy 
promoters have explicitly stated that they promote „political democracy‟ only and that 
this procedural democracy is separable and independent of any particular economic 
system, they have also simultaneously promoted liberal economic capitalism as a key 
„condition‟ or just an addition to democratisation (Diamond 2008; Simons et al 2008). 
Thus, the US, the EU and many NGOs explicitly call for a liberal democratic form of 
governance and see this as going hand in hand with a liberal capitalist market system, 
even if this is conceived as a separate policy agenda. What the current analysis exposes is 
that the division between „democracy‟ and „economy‟ promotion agendas is problematic. 
The reality of democracy promotion may better be described as promotion of specific 
„politico-economic models of democracy‟.  
 
It is crucial to recognise this – for these politico-economic models construct also power 
relations within democratising states and between democratisers and democratisees. 
Critics such as Robinson (1996) and Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (1993) have 
commented on this very powerfully pointing to the kinds of power relations that the 
economic underpinnings of liberal democracy promotion may result in. Their criticisms 
are important. Yet it is important to seek better tools that might assist in the analysis of 
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the nature of normative assumptions in economic theory. What is distinctive about the 
analysis here is that it implies not only that it is important that we recognise the 
embeddedness of democracy promotion efforts within particular economic interests (as 
Robinson and Gills et al have argued) but that we also analyse the deep ways in which 
economic and democratic visions of the world can become intertwined. We are directed 
to critically examine and scrutinize the existing, but also the potentially existing, 
„politico-economic models of democracy‟. Crucially, we are encouraged to do so with a 
view to pluralising our understanding of the range of „politico-economic models of 
democracy‟ that can be conceived to exist. History of democratic theory, but interestingly 
also history of economic thought, provides us with many alternatives to consider to the 
currently dominant liberal „market democracy‟ model. Whether and how practicable 
these will be in practice is another question, but one that should be tackled after, not 
before, consideration of these multiple alternatives. This is particularly topical to discuss 
in the current world political scene where the effects of the financial crisis brought on by 
the fateful adherence to the liberal „market democratic‟ model are so severely felt. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
McCloskey has argued that there is a disjuncture between economists‟ overwhelming 
support for liberal view of the world, which emphasises pluralism, difference, and free 
exchange, and the „illiberal meta-economics‟ underpinning their conception of truth and 
science, which not only pushes out plurality of perspectives and epistemologies, but also 
 37 
sidesteps taking head on complex normative and political questions tied to economic 
science analyses (Garnett 1999: 1; McCloskey 2002, 2006). This paper seeks to extend 
the sort of „pluralising ethos‟ that McCloskey has been calling for in economic science. It 
does so by emphasising the importance of recognising the inter-linkage between 
normative and scientific theorising in economic science and the possibility than hidden 
normative assumptions about things like democracy are secretly passed on in these 
theories. While this is a limited contribution and much remains to be done in conducting 
analysis of the actual forms of normativity that are embedded in economic science and 
economic discourses this contribution is important in a few respects.  
 
First, it points us to consider the contextuality of all debates on economics and also 
crucially on democracy. Democracy „will never be „taken separately‟; it will be „taken 
together‟ with other things‟ (Lenin 1933: 61). This is an important warning and is 
confirmed here in two ways: we can see that economic theories will be „taken together‟ 
with a whole set of assumptions about politics, governance and democracy, as well as 
that democracy when promoted can be „taken together‟ with a whole range of economic 
assumptions and theories. We must also note that there are important variations in the 
kinds of things that are „taken together‟ with economic science discourses: there are 
variations in the normative underpinnings and the political consequences of both 
economic discourses and conceptions of democracy. There is no singular politico-
economic model of democracy, although arguably some (or one) model is currently more 
dominant than others.  
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Second, the discussion here brings home the fact that if we do not recognise the hidden 
normativity in economic science we run the risk of misunderstanding the scope of 
economic discourses and theories in current world politics and the variety of uses they 
can be put to and the consequences they can have. In so doing we may fail to understand 
global financial governance, but also democratisation and democracy promotion 
adequately: as much as global financial governance is complicit in hidden and implicit 
democracy promotion, equally democracy promotion policies of EU and US should be 
recognised to include wider elements than mere democracy promotion, that is, implicit 
liberal market promotion policies.  
 
Finally, the arguments explored here are potentially important for the global financial and 
democracy promotion organisations themselves in a very practical sense: in allowing 
them to confront the paradoxes and contradictions that can and often do exist in their 
frameworks and policies because of the hidden role of specific „politico-economic‟ or 
„democratic‟ value systems in their practices. Indeed, it is instructive to finish by 
remembering Gunnar Myrdal‟s (1953: xii) warning on the dangers of staying oblivious to 
hidden normativity ubiquitous both in our everyday life and in social science:  
 
The practice of expressing political attitudes only through the medium of 
purportedly objective arguments and scientific theories is probably in the long run 
highly injurious to the actual policy that one wishes to support. Quasi-scientific 
rationalization of a political endeavour may be an effective propaganda weapon; yet 
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its effect at the crucial time… is in a democratic setting almost always inhibilatory 
and disintegrating. 
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